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 Abstract 
After the war in Kosovo in 1999 there was much confusion over property 
ownerships. This essay examines the importance of increased property rights for 
economic development in the region since then. The link in focus is that between 
the decisions over property disputes after 1999 and the access to bank credit.  
Because of the short time frame, no data can with accuracy reveal the 
connection between the juridical efforts to solve the property rights situation in 
Kosovo and bank lending. In addition therefore, other macroeconomical data are 
used to analyze the effects of other factors on lending. Showing a significant 
causality is difficult without field studies or larger amounts of data. In this essay, 
signs of a connection between property rights and bank lending are however 
observed, where the influence of other factors can be deemed excluded. The 
connection is attributed to the increased access to credit when bank customers can 
use their legally owned property as collateral security. 
When looking at the broader macroeconomical landscape, there are strong 
indications that credit rationing has been prevalent on the credit market. The 
interplay between property rights and credit access and how it relates to credit 
rationing is explained as well. 
The attention of economists is increasingly turning to the role of well 
functioning institutions. This essay provides a method by which to study a 
phenomenon like property rights, even as access to and reliance on the data is 
severely limited. No previous study found can be closely related to this analysis. 
There are quantitative examinations of legal ownership in relation to access to 
credit, but not in any context similar to that of Kosovo. 
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 1 Introduction 
In a post-war region with a history of insecurity and unrest, a main priority is to set the 
institutional prerequisites needed for economic growth. One such institution is the rule of 
law, a corner stone of which are reliable property rights. 
The Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto (1989, 2001) claimed that properties obtain 
their real capitalized value when they are under formal ownership. One of his arguments was 
that when property can be used as collateral security for loans, this provides the opportunity 
for people to escape poverty. In this paper I examine that notion by analyzing the 
development of property rights in Kosovo after the 1999 war. 
Many different phenomena can be alluded to when the term “property rights” is used. 
The concept is somewhat ambiguous. In the case of Kosovo, information on one aspect of 
the concept, the formal titling of properties after the turmoil of the war, has been 
documented. This is useful for economical analysis. 
The background of the dire property rights situation is one of complexities of the 
interplay between external circumstances and unprofitable domestic policies. Kosovo is a 
former autonomous province of Serbia and is since its declaration of independence in 2008 
considered a republic, recognized since its independence by more than 60 countries, amongst 
which are a majority of the European Union (EU) countries and the United States. 
Kosovo was under the rule of the Ottoman Empire for 450 years. After the Balkan wars 
of 1912 and 1913, the major part of Kosovo was a part of Serbia (Glenny 1999, p. 231). 
When Yugoslavia was being formed in 1918, the region was included in the new state (p. 
367)*. Efforts were made to assimilate the Albanians into the Serbian dominated culture and 
language. In the Second World War, Kosovo became under the control of Albania, which 
was at the time an Italian vassal state. After the war, Kosovo again became a part of 
Yugoslavia, then as an autonomous province within the socialist federal state. The autonomy 
within Serbia was not realized in practice, but the Albanians did at times have the 
opportunity to study in Albanian and enjoy Albanian culture without repression. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
 
* The state was in December 1918 first proclaimed as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. 
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 Since then, the political state of the Albanians, who now constitute over 90 % of the 
population in Kosovo, has varied. During the Milosevic regime in 1989-1999 the control and 
oppression increased. The tense relationship between the largest ethnical groups in Kosovo, 
Albanians and Serbs, thus originates from a long and complicated history. This is a factor 
which, as we will see, has affected the situation of property rights until this day. 
The institutional environment has since 1999 been set and upheld by various 
international organizations, predominantly the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 
the Kosovo Force (KFOR) of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and recently 
the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). The economy has further 
been supported by financial donations from countries and international organizations. These 
have been forming both the economy and politics of Kosovo. 
Though not formally belonging to the euro area, Kosovo uses the euro as its currency 
and has by and large managed to hold inflation low and steady. Until the international 
financial downturn made its mark on Kosovo in 2009, exports from Kosovo had grown by 
18.7 % in one year. However, an already large trade deficit grew in 2008 to 33 % of GDP 
(World Bank 2009). Kosovo currently has a relatively low income tax of 10 % for everyone 
earning above 450 euro per month, a corporate tax of 10 % and a VAT of 16 % (Ministry of 
Economy and Finance 2009)*. 
Kosovo has an abundance of mineral recourses and agricultural land. It has a fairly 
beneficial trade regime and a young population. Meanwhile, the economy is still relying 
heavily on donations and the presence of the international community. The estimated 
unemployment rate is around 40 %, which is one of several indicators that the economy is in 
a dire state. An important aim of the politicians in Kosovo is to attract foreign investment to 
the country. Still, there are many constraints to investment in infrastructure, with the 
unreliable supply of electricity perhaps being the major one. 
As in any country, a functioning system of rule of law will be a corner stone for a 
prosperous economy in Kosovo, of which property rights constitute an important part. 
Studying previous impacts of the work to establish secure property ownership on the 
economy might therefore, among other things, provide indications of its importance in the 
future. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
 
* Rates were changed in January 2009 from 20%, 20% and 15% respectively. 
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 1.1 Purpose 
The aim of this paper is to examine economic factors connecting enhanced property rights to 
residential properties and agriculture land with the increased lending in Kosovo after the 
war. Because of the small quantity of data, it is not my aim to find statistically significant 
proof of the importance of property rights or to quantify its contribution to the economy. 
Rather, I explore key macro economical factors that might be used for the analysis when 
data is limited. 
The analysis is based on the theories and empirical studies that are presented in section II 
of the essay. My hypothesis is that a larger amount of legal property owners has led to more 
bank customers with access to collateral security, which in turn has enabled them to be 
granted loans from banks. 
 
 Three questions are central throughout the essay: 
  
• Are there any signs of connections between property rights and increased lending? 
• If there are, what other macro economic data could falsify this notion?  
• Does increased access to collateral security seem to be behind the rise in the amount 
of bank credit? 
1.2 Delimitation 
For reasons found in the stormy history of Kosovo, statistical data is not always reliable and 
sometimes incomplete*. This, in combination with short data series, precludes any robust 
conclusions from statistics. Regressions using large samples of data or qualitative 
assessment by field studies would have provided a more robust picture. 
Statistically robust conclusions are therefore not aimed at in this essay. Instead, a broader 
picture of a phenomenon like the access to bank credit is painted, with the inclusion of 
several macro economical indicators. I will mainly use macro economic data, which because 
of its limited scope in time and geographical space is not voluminous. 
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 When examining the impact of other factors than property rights, I limit the analysis to 
factors having the most direct effect on the lending rate. Many institutions, formal as well as 
informal, have implications on the decisions of banks, firms and households. Their decisions 
depend on a sense of security and trust in the economic system, which is influenced not only 
by the economical, but also the political and social environment. It is impossible to give the 
whole picture of what is behind the statistics on bank lending. The indicators included can 
however provide a depiction which is broad enough, while keeping the analysis simple. 
1.3 Disposition 
In section II useful experience from theories and empirical evidence from previous studies is 
presented. An overview of the theory on property rights in general is followed by its 
connection with credit access in particular. The section reveals the practical mechanisms, as 
well as the obstacles, behind the relationship between property rights and bank lending.  
In section III, the development of the property rights situation in Kosovo is outlined to 
raise an awareness of its complexity. In section IV, the efforts executed by the authorities to 
enhance the property rights situation are summarized. In section V, I explore the 
relationships between data on property rights, bank credit and other macro economical 
indicators in Kosovo and in some neighbouring countries. In section VI I draw conclusions 
from the analysis. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
 
* Explanations of the data on claim resolutions and GDP are found in the appendix at the end of the essay. 
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 2 Theoretical framework and previous 
research 
This section provides a presentation of relevant theories and empirical studies, explaining 
the importance of property rights and the connection to bank lending. The purpose of his 
exposition is to define the property rights concept and to clarify what the theory about the 
interplay between property rights and lending is based upon. 
Theories relating to the very basics of the importance of institutions for growth are 
included, and to the issue of collateral security as a precondition for access to credit 
specifically. This is to clearly outline the basis of the presumption of the importance of 
collateral security for bank lending, the importance of a developed financial market and the 
implications on economical growth in general. 
When property rights in Kosovo are examined in this paper, the focus is on the 
quantitative occurrence of legal titling of properties. My way of examining the relationship 
between property rights and property titling programs is not similar to that of any previous 
study, which may be a strength, as well as a weakness. Most previous research has explored 
the difference between countries in property rights security, and its implications on issues 
like economic growth. Even though previous studies are quite different to this essay, they 
can together form a basis both in support and in defiance of my conclusions. 
2.1 The broad concept of property rights 
Legal ownership is a corner stone in the theoretical framework on property rights. However, 
it is by no means the only basis on which secured property rights stand. A majority of studies 
on the subject focuses on the risk of the property right being violated or on the obstacles in 
the way of obtaining legal ownership. The different definitions of the denomination of 
property rights are important to keep separate. 
The projects Doing Business (Doing Business 2009) and Property Rights Index 
(Property Rights Index 2009) analyze the current state of property rights in different 
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 countries. Their definitions of property rights include the legal and political environment, the 
procedures around registration and protection of physical as well as intellectual property to a 
country’s gender equality. In scholar papers on property rights, factors like corruption in a 
society and the secure implementation of contracts by a stable rule of law is frequently 
accounted for in assessing the quality of property rights. 
By the broad range of definitions of secure property rights, different issues can be 
alluded to under the same denomination. When studying the legal determination of a 
person’s ownership of a property, it is the legal titling, and thus the expected strengthening 
of a property’s legal status, that is taken into account. Categories of ownership rights, the 
kind of rights one has to the land or the house, are in Roman law the right to use an asset, to 
capture benefits from an asset, to change its form and substance and to “transfer all or some 
of the rights specified above to others at a mutually agreed price“ (Pejovich 1990: 27–8). 
These legal rights are cornerstones of many assumptions about the effect of secure 
ownership. In this essay, property rights are referred to as the titling of properties and 
adjudications of ownership. Changes in the broader climate for secure property rights are 
thus not focused upon. 
Property rights were for a long time taken as a given in studies of economics. It has now 
been given attention in many academic studies (Boudreaux 2005 p.3) and so has thereby the 
issue of quantitatively measuring those property rights. In a study of the impact of political 
institutions on growth, Glaeser et al. (2004) criticized measurements on institution 
commonly used in studies on their impact on growth. They found that estimates of the risk 
of expropriation or judicial independence as a measurement of property rights are too 
volatile to establish their relation to growth. Instead, they argued, one should focus on de 
facto existing laws determining ownership in the country of concern (p.298). 
Acemoglu et al. (2004 p.2) pointed out that property rights, among other institutions, 
might be endogenous, determined by the society in question. While links between secure 
property rights and economic growth can be observed, this might also be a case of reverse 
causality (p.17). It seems plausible for instance, that in most cases economic growth will 
foster better institutions, including more secure property rights. 
. These factors of uncertainty are not prevalent in the case of Kosovo. With the definition 
of property rights as the number of legal titles to properties, many problems concerning 
measurement are avoided. Property rights are quantifiable and it is clear that enhanced 
property rights resulted from decisions and legislation of the official authorities. They were 
not caused primarily by rapid growth or a particularly trustworthy society. 
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 Some of the theories and empirical studies in this section apply the broader definition of 
property rights that differs from that of legal titling while they can still bring clarity of the 
effects of property rights in general. I leave out studies on property rights, however 
interesting, with a definition of property rights that is far from being relevant to this study. 
2.2 Better allocation of recourses 
Property rights are important for economic growth, primarily trough improved allocation of 
recourses and the capitalization of property. The latter factor is what I concentrate on in this 
essay, but the mechanism behind better allocation of recourses are presented here in order to 
make the distinction between them.. 
In 1937, Coase (1937) explored the importance of well defined property rights and 
institutions. When elaborating on the determinations of the size of a firm, he explained how 
all negative externalities of a firm can be neutralized by negotiation, as long as property 
rights are securely in place and there are no transaction costs. Under such conditions, people 
are able to bargain with each other and reach the optimal allocation of resources. 
Coase (1960) further studied the crucial role of property rights in avoiding or 
neutralizing negative externalities. He raised forward the argument that the ability to 
negotiate about each others actions can lead to the ultimate allocation of recourses. For this 
to be possible, property rights must be well defined. 
Papers written on property rights as an institution leading to more efficient allocations of 
recourses are numerous. Amongst them are also studies where property rights are defined as 
legal titling. Field (2007) studied a Peruvian state program providing property titling to 
urban households and its effect on the labour market in the country. She found that increased 
property rights shifted labour supply from domestic work to the labour market. Legal home 
owners seemed able to spend less time on property protection and on work in the house. 
Thus, the households gaining title to their property increased their labour hours and used 
their time in a more productive way than previously. 
Schweigert (2006) studied the importance of property titles on the investment and output 
of farms by analyzing the effects from a titling program on rural households with 
agricultural land in Guatemala. Acknowledging that property rights have been shown to 
increase the access to credits for firms, he controlled for the effect that credit access might 
have on firms. He then solely examined the impact of property rights through the so called 
 7
 “tenure security channel”. This is the security originating from the basic right to the fruit of 
one’s labour, that induces a family to increase the labour, and thus investment, in the 
property. He found that ownership of a property did indeed have positive effects on farm 
investment and output. The study excluded the effect on growth of the credit market, which 
impact on the economy was not given attention. 
In a study of rural Cambodia, Markussen (2008) found that legal ownership of land 
property had positive effects on both property value and agriculture output. He concluded 
that this was due to the tenure security channel, and not through the credit market. 
Markussen made a connection between the absence of effects of ownership through the 
credit market and the low level of financial development in the country. Cambodia is a 
somewhat special case because of its weak state. The study therefore indicated that the 
positive effects from proper legal ownership indeed occur even under such circumstances. 
This implies that the tenure security effect can be even more significant in countries with 
more robust legal structures. 
The same conclusion is drawn by de Soto (1989 p.173) from a study of properties in the 
informal settlements in Lima in Peru. He found that similar properties were worth 40 times 
as much if they were legally titled as those that were not. Proper ownership seemingly 
induced more investment in the property. When people modernize and combine their 
property in ways leading to the best outcome, de Soto reasoned, this benefits the whole 
society. 
Another way in which efficient allocation of resources come about with proper 
ownership is the more efficient way in which collective goods can be agreed upon and 
purchased in a more orderly, and therefore more beneficial, fashion. This is an issue which 
Soto observed in Lima, where almost half of the water and electricity supply was not being 
accounted for. In this context, illegal construction is a major problem. Commodities like 
networks for electricity and water are less likely to come about when customers are unlikely 
to pay their bills (de Soto 2001 p.73). In an area where houses are constructed illegally, the 
lack of property rights makes investing in common recourses less profitable. 
2.3 The importance of the financial sector 
The sophistication of a country’s financial system is important for the size of the impact of 
property rights on the economy. The allocation of monetary recourses, as well as the pricing 
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 of assets, is best realized through a modern banking system. Some studies provide 
convincing arguments on the importance of the financial system for growth and its 
connection to property rights. 
Haber (2002) studied why the economy of the United States has grown so rapidly in 
comparison to that of Mexico. He found that differences in the development of financial 
markets in the United States and Mexico had major effects on growth. In the United States, 
the broadening of the suffrage around 1850 led to people voting to release the banks from 
certain regulations, making credit more obtainable. In Mexico, banks were granted 
monopoly status by the government. While the United States in 1920 had a functioning and 
competitive banking sector of 25,000 banks, Mexico had only 42 basically non-competing 
banks. The economic growth has since been significantly faster in the United States than in 
Mexico and GDP per capita is today around four times as high in the Unites States compared 
to that in Mexico. 
Other studies have implications on the connection between property rights and financial 
markets. Claessens and Laeven (2003) assessed that property rights play an important role in 
the growth of firms, but only when the financial infrastructure is sufficiently developed. 
According to their model, property rights alone did not have a statistically significant impact 
on growth. However, an interaction term between property rights and a measurement of 
financial system sophistication did have a positive significant impact. This implies that 
secure property rights can favour prosperous asset allocation, but that a robust financial 
structure must be in place in order for that allocation to come about. It can also imply that 
only in an economy where enhanced property rights lead to a functioning financial market 
do they have a positive impact on growth. 
To sum up, the financial system is crucial for growth and it might even be a necessary 
element for property rights to boost growth. Property rights and financial markets are 
interconnected, and may well reinforce each other. It does at least seem like enhanced 
property rights can lead to a better financial system by increasing the access to bank credit. 
2.4 Access to credit 
The impact of property rights through increased access to credit is in many studies 
compensated for instead of examined in itself. The relationship between these factors are 
however crucial for this essay. It explains why a functioning market where property can be 
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 used as collateral security for loans creates a better financial environment. The price of 
lending money is then determined by more than the interest rate. 
2.4.1 Collateral security and interest rates: the cost of credit 
Collateral security for a loan can be a way to compensate for the insufficient role of interest 
rates in agreements about credit. Stigler (1967) pointed out that for a lender, there is always 
a risk of moral hazard, as it is impossible to completely trust the borrower not to disappear. 
Furthermore, the borrower and the lender will always make different risk assessments. The 
borrower may know that he is basically risk free, while the lender must assume that all 
borrowers are somewhat risky. Merely negotiating about interest rates may not lead to 
equilibrium, since the borrower will not find the risk compensation for the loan sufficient. 
Hoff and Stiglit (1990) explained how collateral security is one of several instruments 
through which to overcome the case of asymmetric information that persist in the credit 
market. Legal ownership of a property can be used as collateral security for the lenders to 
judge whether the borrower is credit worthy. 
The credit market can be seen as moving towards equilibrium between the supply and 
the demand for credit depending on the interest rate and the collateral security for a loan. If 
collateral is used, it creates an incentive for the borrower not to default on the loan (Feder et 
al. 1988). This increased security should in theory lower the interest loan rate as the risk is 
reduced, making it more profitable for a borrower with access to collateral security to ask for 
credit.  
Barro (1976) used a theoretical model to analyze the role of collateral in determining 
loan interest rates. He observed the case when the loan default would impose high 
transaction costs of a shift in the ownership of the commodity used as collateral security. 
Barro concluded that with higher costs of the shift, the interest rate for the loan would be 
higher too. 
2.4.2 What can be used as collateral security? 
Theoretically, any property can be used as collateral security. In practice, the more immobile 
a property is, the best it constitutes a security for a loan, as it will not easily disappear. Land 
is the ultimate non-movable property and is a widely used type of collateral. It is especially 
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 feasible where land is scarce. A house is extremely hard to transport, but can in theory be 
moved or destroyed before a new owner can take possession of it. 
In a study on Asian countries, Feder, Onchar and Raparla (1988) concluded that 
institutional lenders, like banks and government agencies, preferred land rather than other 
securities for a loan. Also, they showed that they indeed seemed to offer more credit to 
farmers with access to collateral. Group security, however, where a group of people sign up 
as responsible for repayment of a loan, did not provide a better chance to obtain a loan from 
banks or government agencies.  
The type of ownership over the property may also be important. A bank is more willing 
to lend money if it knows that the borrower actually does dispose of the land and has the 
possibility to sell it or at least to transfer user rights (Feder, Feeny 1991 p.141). The 
beneficial effects from property rights are therefore unlikely to persist when only usufruct 
certificates are issued instead of ownership. 
Feder, Onchan and Chalamwong (1988) observed that certificates of limited usufruct 
rights issued by the government to farmers in Thailand did not increase the access to credit 
from institutional lenders, such as banks. Farmers titled as proper owners, meanwhile, could 
provide collateral for the loans and therefore they had better access to the credit. 
2.4.3 When property turns into capital 
The public understanding of property rights as a means to raise people from poverty was 
accomplished not least by Hernando de Soto (1989, 2001). Properties with proper legal 
ownership can be used as security for a loan, he argued, since it can be classified and 
categorized in a way not possible in its “illegal” state. 
He pointed out that when a mortgage is granted, the house or the land itself is not the 
object taken into account. Instead, the title and the official document representing proper, 
legal and secure ownership is what is being accounted for (2001 p.78). No descriptions or 
photographs of a house or a piece of land can make up for this. When the value of a property 
is officially registered, a bank can be sure of its usefulness as collateral security for a loan. 
Property rights were explicitly connected by de Soto with the very fundament of capital 
markets. When property is within formal ownership, business networking is possible 
between people who are unfamiliar with each other, far beyond the family or the clan. A 
bank does not have to know personal details about a customer to find out whether the person 
is reliable or not, and trade in capital can be conducted across borders. Objective valuations 
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 of assets enable a lender to spread the risk through various types of insurance solutions. The 
conditions for the bank offering credit to customers are enhanced, which makes the bank 
more willing to grant credit and perhaps lower interest rates (pp.73, 86).  
Property rights empower the poor economically via their ability to capitalize on their 
assets, de Soto argued. From field studies in Latin America, he assessed that despite of a 
high value of their properties, the owners remained poor because of the lack of legal 
ownership. Once people could use their properties in a legal fashion, these “dead assets” 
could come to life into the system of capital. 
A few studies take on the task of empirically examining the link between property rights 
and the access to credit. In their study including 43 countries, Qian and Strahan (2007) 
revealed the connection between creditor protection and the willingness of banks to offer 
loans to firms, with both longer maturity and lower interest rates. They also found that this 
effect was stronger on a country’s foreign banks than on domestic ones. This is because 
international banks have branches in many other countries and are therefore more sensitive 
to institutional change in a single country. Also, they recognized that domestic banks are 
more able to assess borrower risk and solve control problems without demanding collateral 
security.  
The importance of property rights as a means to secure a loan has also been examined on 
a firm level in a study by Johnson et al. (2002). They measured the importance of factors 
like property rights on the investment of firms in several post-communist countries and their 
tendency to demand credit from banks. In this study, property rights were not defined as 
official ownership but assessed by institutional features, like the perceived security and 
whether courts could effectively enforce contracts. 
They found that secure property rights indeed played an important role for the 
willingness to invest in the firms included in the study and also for firms to demand bank 
credit. They also saw that almost all firms in the study needed to use collateral security to 
gain access to loans. 
Field (2006 p.5) found in a study of a titling program in Peru that secured property rights 
might increase the credibility of a borrower also through the labor market. As a legally 
registered house owner is more likely to be employed, she reasoned, the person becomes a 
credible credit receiver as a result of a steady income. 
It seems that property rights are important for receiving credit, by the use of the assets as 
collateral and in other ways. Most empirical support for this is centered upon firms but the 
underlying mechanisms for this are in most cases applicable on households as well. 
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 2.5 Studies revealing the obstacles  
Some studies on credit access in connection to property rights have shown that obstacles 
might occur, preventing increased access to credit through titling programs. All possible 
complications may not be persistent in the case of Kosovo, but it is useful to understand 
what mechanisms might be disrupting the process. 
In some cases, the effects on access to credit as a result of land titling are distorted by 
government ownership and regulations. Field (2006) focused on the impact of a government 
titling programs on the Peruvian banks’ willingness to issue credit to households. She 
stressed that credit may not become accessible to property owners, as the state driven 
program signals that the government is prioritizing the poor and therefore will be siding with 
them in the case of a property dispute. This increases uncertainty for the banks and makes 
them less willing to give loans to poor households (p.24). 
When banks of both private and governmental ownership are involved, the observations 
might be complicated to interpret. Field (p.3) found that property ownership did not seem to 
have any effect on the tendency of private banks to supply loans by using the property as 
collateral. She concluded that this was because the state owned bank in her study issued the 
bulk of the larger loans, leaving customers demanding smaller loans to private banks. Since 
collateral security is rarely demanded for smaller loans, property rights did not affect the 
access to private bank credit. 
Musembi (2007) made similar conclusions when studying title programs in African 
countries and conducting field studies in Eastern Kenya. She saw that formal titling had no 
effect on African farmers’ tendency to take on bank loans. Musembi connected this to the 
tendency of banks to shun small-scale landholders (p.1466). Also, she observed 
unwillingness amongst the people to risk the family land for a loan. 
Musembi also criticized the theories of de Soto about the empowerment of poor people 
by the capitalization of their assets, and stressed that a property system is a social system 
dependent on its cultural context (p.1462). If this context is not right, a new formalized 
property system will not be the most efficient one. 
Möllerström explains how in a severe conflict, it is hard to judge what is “most right” in 
a property ownership dispute. One can establish this by juridical considerations, but the 
conclusion might not be the morally right one. A lawful owner might return to a village with 
a changed ethnical identity, and this might lead to insecurity (2009 p.65). The same 
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 argument was put forward by Feder and Feeny (1991). They recognized that secure property 
rights rely not only on the legal registration of the ownership, but also on the implementation 
of property rights, which is dependent on social rules and contracts (p.137). 
Carter and Olinto (2003) examined the impact of land titling of agricultural land on 
Paraguayan farmers. They studied both the willingness to invest in the land and the access to 
credits of farmers gaining legal titling of their land. Two conclusions were reached. There 
was no increased access to credit for smaller farmers, who constitute the bulk of the 
Paraguayan farming sector. Also, tenure security led not only to an increased demand for 
immovable property by farmers, but also to a decrease in the demand for the movable capital 
goods that cannot be used as collateral security in the case of loan default. They assessed 
that if this diversion is not combined with increased access to credit, there will only be a 
shift in investment from movable to immovable assets. Titling did therefore only seem to 
benefit the bigger farmers, for whom access to credit was increased due to the titling 
program. 
Observing the Paraguayan financial market, Carter and Olinto concluded that titling 
reform must be accompanied by a reform in the credit market if it is to benefit the economy. 
Increased credit demand may follow from the incentive to invest in a titled property. But if 
demand is not met by supply, there will be a move of capital from movable property to the 
immobile agricultural land or residential property. This is merely a change in the optimal 
investment in different kinds of assets. Households may be investing more in renovating and 
enhancing their houses, while cutting down on investment in commodities like education 
and pottery. Farmers invest more in the land and less on machinery, equipment and 
livestock. The economy as a whole is however by no means larger or more efficient. 
This means that the benefits of property rights measured by the value of an immovable 
property such as a house or a patch of land might be misleading. One must also include the 
changes in value of movable property. If credit supply really does increase however, the 
value of movables might be constant while that of immovable property is increased. 
Boudreax (2006) was also critical of the impact of property rights on access to capital. 
She studied the governmental titling effort in Langa Township in South Africa and observed 
that the formal ownership of properties had contributed to growth and alleviated poverty. 
But she also fund that people with secured property rights still preferred to finance their 
investments through personal savings or savings clubs, rather than through commercial 
banks. 
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 Some of the reasons for this may also have implications on countries in South-eastern 
Europe. Boudreax recognized that using a home as collateral security imposed a risk of 
losing it. This affected the whole family and sometimes the family business. There is a 
general inconvenience in worrying about repayments. Rather than receiving a mortgage to 
build a house, some people will instead prefer to erect it brick by brick, in the same paste as 
money can be spared. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This exposé of theories and empirical studies does not point in one direction. No theory can 
be completely relied upon to hold true in any environment. Instead, a notion has been given 
on some of the variety of arguments concerning the theories upon which this essay relies. 
Property rights are a fundamental institution, and well functioning institutions are the 
backbone of economic growth. Financial markets appear to be another. If it is true that 
reliable property ownership increases the trust of banks, which then supply more credit, then 
property rights can enhance the financial markets, and thus spur economic growth. Instead of 
relying on a functioning financial market in order to spur economic growth, property rights 
might actually help in creating it. One link in this chain of causality is the one between 
property rights and increased credit lending. That relationship, the usage of property rights 
as collateral security for loans, is the focus of this essay. 
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 3 The background to a dire property rights 
situation 
State policies depraving the property rights situation of Kosovo can be found without 
looking far back in time. Various regulations after 1989 prevented free transaction of 
property rights. The way forward for the UN administration in Kosovo has not been self-
evident. When previous regulations have stirred the property market in one direction, new 
ones have been implemented to resolve a seemingly unjust situation. However, the reliance 
on informal institutions of what is morally right can sometimes contradict institutions like 
the rule of law.  
3.1 Historical background 
Kosovo has a long history of conflicts, ever changing political and economical rules and 
limited trade. This has had a detrimental effect on the economic development of Kosovo. 
The property rights situation has also been shaken by the uncertain climate throughout the 
history. The dire situation after the war in 1999 has however partly been formed as late as in 
the 1990-th. 
Before the war in 1999, socially and state owned property constituted 43 % of properties 
in Kosovo. Residential property was primarily socially owned apartments and people living 
in them were not formally owners but obtained occupancy rights. 
Between 1989 and 1999, Kosovo lost its entitlement to self-government, which had 
implications on the property rights situation. As many Albanians were dismissed from jobs 
at public companies, they also lost their right to socially owned housing. As of 1992, the 
apartments could be bought from the state and made into ownership right. This resulted in 
many more Serbs than Albanians being property owners. Further, in order to stem 
emigration of Serbs from Kosovo, restrictions were made on to whom people could sell their 
property (HPD March 2002 p.1). Serbs were effectively prevented from selling residential 
property to Albanians. This resulted in a system of transactions of property from Serbs to 
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 Albanians outside the legal framework and outside any cadastre or property record (HPCC 
2007). 
3.2 The destruction of violence 
The war in 1999 made the property situation exceedingly complicated, as people fled their 
homes and as houses were destroyed. Many of the estimated 860,000 Albanians who fled 
Kosovo during years of turmoil returned when the NATO forces were deployed in Kosovo. 
Meanwhile, an estimated 230,000 Serbs left the region in fear of Albanian reprisal (von 
Carlowitz 2004 p.606).  
Almost one half of all available housing was destroyed during the war, an amount 
estimated to a hundred thousand housing units (HPD March 2002 p.1).  Tens of thousands of 
people did not have anywhere to live as the conflict ended and they had to find alternative 
shelter within Kosovo. Many refugees returning to Kosovo put in requisition abandoned 
apartments and houses, in which they stayed for many years (Ombudsperson Institution 
2006 p.41). Numerous properties had been unofficially purchased by Albanians from Serbs 
because of the legal restrictions against it. Altogether, this meant that the legal status of 
many properties in Kosovo was highly insecure. 
In March 2004, riots broke out in Kosovo, causing the worst wave of destruction since 
the war. An additional 10,401 properties were then identified as destroyed, a majority of 
which belonged to minority community members. Though most of the property owners were 
seeking compensation for the damages, many of the cases were still pending in court in 2007 
(OSCE 2007 pp.31-32).  
3.3 The emergence of new illegal houses 
Primarily due to the weakly implemented legal framework after the war, illegal 
constructions surged. They emerged on occupied land without the authorities interfering. It 
has been estimated that around 30,000 illegal constructions were conducted during the first 
years after the war (USAID 2004). This did often prevent municipal authorities from 
efficiently providing inhabitants with water and electricity, and it was detrimental to urban 
planning. Furthermore, illegal constructions were often erected on the land of a property 
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 owner, the property right of whom was thereby violated. Many businesses would thus 
emerge and run for years on occupied land (Kretsi 2007 p.666). 
The municipalities meanwhile were dealing with the problem most inconsistently. There 
were laws allowing them to demolish illegal constructions under certain premises, but this 
was hardly ever implemented (USAID 2004 pp.32-33). There were inevitably 
inconsistencies in the risks of constructing a home on a patch of land that in fact belonged to 
someone else. 
3.4 Helping or hindering refugees and minorities 
In restoring the rule of law, international bodies operating in Kosovo put great emphasis on 
the right of minorities and on the urgency of the return of internally and externally displaced 
people. How many of those who fled that has actually returned is disputed. It is clear though 
that there are still many refugees within as well as outside Kosovo (Kretsi 2007 p.667).  
One aim was to achieve a property rights situation that is not only lawful, but also fair to 
minority groups. This has influenced the institutional setting to solve the property rights 
situation, in a way that might not only have been favorable. To prevent ethnically strategic 
transfers of property rights after the war, a special set of laws was adopted*. In certain areas, 
an approval was needed from UNMIK Municipal Administrator before a court could verify 
the sell (OSCE 2003 p.34). Agriculture land was, however, exempted from this regulation. 
The regulation was intended to secure the right of minority people to stay in Kosovo and 
avoid marginalization. But it has been criticized for hindering voluntary transactions of 
property. It seems like the regulation has prevented the regulated property market that 
existed before 1999 from developing and modernizing. OSCE (2003) found that the 
regulations “create more problems than they solve from a human rights perspective” (p.48). 
OSCE claimed that the restrictions were disproportionate. The regulations were partly 
imprecise and in practice ended up being circumvented by many parties. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
 
* This was UNMIK Regulation 2001/17. The Ombudsperson institution deemed it “incompatible with recognised 
international standards” in the report ‘Regarding the refusal of UNMIK to register a contract for the sale of a residential 
property in Lipjan/Lipljan’ (2202-04-22, Included in EULEX Justice-Specific Training Site: http://www.eulex-
kosovo.eu/training/?id=13.). In the report, they call for the abolishment of the regulation.  
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 Non-legally binding guidelines were issued to secure the reconstruction of damaged 
property. As the mechanisms in these guidelines were often not used they did, alas, not 
secure the right to return for people from Kosovo. The OSCE concluded (2003) that the 
guidelines would have needed to be legally binding to secure property rights. As an example, 
the authorities would in many cases rebuild a property, the owner of which would then 
continue to occupy another person’s property without the authorities preventing it (p.68). 
3.5 Laws and moral confusion 
The legal framework for property rights in place after the war has been causing confusion. It 
consists of laws from before 1989, some laws from the period 1989-1999 and UNMIK laws 
promulgated after 1999. No law conflicting any UNMIK regulation is to be considered valid 
(OSCE 2003 pp.3-4, 2009 p.6). 
The property records of the old cadastre from Yugoslavian times were in many parts 
either inadequately founded or destroyed in the war. In many cases, the legal transfer of 
ownership of agricultural land was not updated. The registrations of property ownership, 
meanwhile, were in some cases manipulated by the very officials responsible for it (OSCE 
2003 pp.8-9, 2009 p.4). Further, the courts have been deemed unable to appropriately apply 
property laws and in general incapable or unwilling to protect property rights. Both central 
and municipal authorities also failed to use the ‘Law on Expropriation’ to lawfully interfere 
and establish proper property ownership (OSCE 2003 pp.36-46). 
As UNMIK was established in Kosovo after the war, it was explicitly obliged to repeal 
the discriminatory laws of the Milosevic regime. It was however unclear whether it would 
refuse those who benefited from the policies of the Milosevic regime the right to their homes 
if it would be considered morally right on historical grounds. There were also publicly 
owned apartments still under construction, which mainly Albanian workers had been 
erecting. 
The underlying informal institutions thus induce some essential questions. What is 
socially accepted and by whom? Who are the righteous owners of the former socially owned 
properties? Would distribution of properties by the UN become another politically biased 
gesture with the intention to restore social justice (Kretsi 2007 pp.667, 671)? Institutions 
were then founded in part to prevent this from happening. They are presented in the next 
section. 
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 4 Bringing justice 
The situation in Kosovo after the 1999 war was very different from that in countries where 
previous studies of titling programs have been conducted. Neither did the measures taken to 
resolve the dire property rights situation resemble those in these empirical examples. An 
understanding of this conduct is needed to properly interpret the relationship emerging 
between the work by these authorities and the effect it had on crucial economical factors. 
4.1 The task of a new directorate 
In 1999, the Housing and Property Directorate (HPD) with its juridical branch the Housing 
and Property Claims Commission (HPCC) were established under the administration of UN-
HABITAT. The HPD mainly received and processed property claims and the HPCC 
adjudicated them (Smith 2006 p.67, OSCE 2003 p.12). With the HPD being an international 
body, it was expected to be able to judge fairly between different ethnicities involved in the 
disputes (Kretsi 2007 p.668). 
Due mainly to the lack of financing and a poor experience of UN-HABITAT the 
progress of the HPD was slow (Smith 2006 p.67). In March 2002, only 328 claims had been 
decided upon since the start in January 2001 (HPD 2002). In June, much needed donor 
funding was however received, enabling HPD to carry on with its mandate (HPD September 
2002, December 2002). 
The administration of HPD/CC was handled over to UNMIK in November 2002 (HPCC 
2007 p.30) whereby the efficiency of the directory was enhanced significantly in the 
beginning of 2003. Similar claims were now brought together in groups of around ten claims 
each and a decision was made over all of them at once (Smith 2006 p.68). 
Claims to HPD were to belong to one of three categories: Those who had lost their 
residential property right because of the discriminatory laws employed after 1989. Those 
who lived in a property that they had bought informally and were asking for a legal 
registration of the ownership. Those who lost their residence to illegal occupants after the 
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 war in 1999. This third category was the most frequent one (OSCE 2003 p13, Kretsi 2007 
p.668). 
When 29,154 claims had been filed in December 2005, 27,177 of them, or 93,2 %, were 
of the latter category. They were mainly internally displaced persons, a majority of which 
were non-Albanians. Meanwhile, most intricate were the cases concerning the loss of 
property because of the discriminatory laws of 1989 to 1999 (Kretsi 2007 p675). 
4.2 Expanding the mandate 
In 2006 HPD was replaced by the Kosovo Property Agency (KPA), which had a broader 
mandate. Not only would it deal with residential property, but commercial property and 
agricultural land as well. Also, offices opened in Serbia proper, Montenegro and FYROM, 
providing the opportunity for refugees there to file their claims without travelling to Kosovo 
(KPA 2007 p.23).  
Instead of HPCC, the Kosovo Property Claims Commission (KPCC) was installed within 
KPA. They set a deadline for claim filing to 3 December 2007. For a faster process, KPCC 
decided, as did HPD, on claims without oral hearings for every case (pp.25-26). 
4.3 The claim process in practice 
HPD and KPA did in general process the claims in similar ways. If a property had been 
illegally occupied, a claimant would handle a claim to the authority, after which the 
occupant would be notified and allowed to handle in information to prove one’s right to 
remain in possession of the property (HPCC 2007 p.41). The case would be investigated, 
and if the parties were in a dispute, HPD or KPA made a recommendation to their judicial 
branches to make an independent review of the case. If the judgment benefited the claimant, 
the occupier had to vacate the property within 30 days (pp. 46, 60, 62). 
In many cases, the claimant being granted ownership did not want to move back into the 
property. As an alternative to selling, the premises could be placed under HPD or KPA 
administration. The resident could then be used for humanitarian housing purposes by HPD 
and also, as KPA was established, leased, allowing the property owner to profit from the 
arrangement (HPCC 2007 pp.68-69, KPA 2007 pp.45-46).  
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 In December 2005, 12,2 % of claimants winning a case had asked for property 
administration (HPD 2005). During 2004 and 2005, many claimants from minority 
communities recovered their properties from HPD only in order to sell them (Kresi 2007 
p.675). 
4.4 The right to return of the minority communities 
In an economical perspective, which ethnical group that property ownerships were granted 
to might seem irrelevant. It does however have important implications when considered as 
an institution that is to be maintained in the future. If a decision on ownership is not accepted 
in a community, it is less likely to be sustainable. Kretsi (2007 p.664) recognized the 
complexities that this posed to Kosovo. Adopted norms and local legal systems concerning 
property rights, he explained, cause hierarchical systems that are important to consider. 
Staying impartial was therefore a crucial issue for the new authorities. On its homepage, 
the HPD stated clearly that its mandate was to settle legal disputes and declared that “[t]he 
HPD is not a returns agency” (HPD 2009). The HPD decided on claims but left the issue of 
return to the property owners. 
Smit (2006 p.72) was critical to HPD not considering the rights of internal refugees to 
return. She argued that it failed to create a “property rights-respecting culture” and a culture 
of rule of law. A symptom of this unsustainable situation is how, during the riots in 2004, 
people took advantage of the turmoil to break into properties that were under HPD 
administration, considering themselves to be entitled to the premises (p.77). Smit stressed 
that rather than restitution is compensation a more sustainable solution. Reintegration into 
the society might be too complicated for people from minority communities (p.81). 
Those asking for HPD administration of a property were mostly from minority 
communities. They would wait and see how the political climate evolved before returning, 
and sell their property if they found it inopportune to return (Kretsi 2007 p.675). 
Burbuqe Hashimi, mortgage sales manager at Raiffeisen Bank in Kosovo, confirms that 
property under KPA administration is not seen as collateral for a mortgage loan (Raiffeisen 
Bank 2009). The issue of HPD or KPA administration does therefore have some implication 
for the analysis. Not until the property owners decided to sell the property and a proper 
ownership emerges, would the house be useful as collateral security for a loan. 
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 5 Examining the Kosovo case 
Economic theory and empirical studies presented in section II revealed ways in which 
property rights security and titling programs are connected to the banking sector. The efforts 
to enhance the property rights situation in Kosovo may through these mechanisms have 
affected the economy. In this section, macroeconomical data is used to examine whether 
these effects can be observed and thus the theory about collateral security as a source of 
increased lending supported. 
Lending is effected by many other factors than secure property rights. I therefore look 
into a few main macroeconomical factors to assess whether they have effected lending. I 
show how the impact of other factors in most cases can be falsified. 
When the KPA started functioning in 2006, the largest part of claims no longer 
concerned households but agricultural land. The analysis is therefore divided into two time 
periods, that of the HPD and that of the KPA. From the perspective of economical analysis, 
this is unfortunate. It would be better to study either residential or agriculture property data 
for the whole period after the war and until 2008, with longer time series. 
Also, there has been another institutional effort to enhance property rights within the 
agricultural sector. Privatization of firms and arable land was conducted by the authorities in 
Kosovo as a part of the reform to a market economy. This would have effected bank lending 
to agriculture and other business. I therefore examine this relationship as well. 
5.1 HPD claims and household loans 
HPD dealt exclusively with residential property claims. The period when most residential 
property claims were decided upon was between April 2003 and August 2005. Decisions on 
claims on residential property decreased significantly after the summer of 2005 and in 2006, 
the mandate of HPD finished as KPA was established. Its claims mainly concerned 
agricultural land. 
In order to study the effects of claim resolutions on the granting of credits to households, 
I focus on the intense period of HDP claim resolutions. It shall be emphasized that a time lag 
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 of at least one month can be expected between the decision on a claim and the point at which 
a new owner is in possession of a property (HPCC 2007 pp.70-71). 
As some theories imply, households gaining ownership through an HPD decision would 
be able to use the property as collateral security and be more likely to receive larger credits 
from the commercial banks. The previous property resident would likely not have been 
perceived by the bank as credible enough to receive such a loan. 
5.1.1 Decisions statistics on residential property  
Up until October 2006, HPD decided upon 29,160 claims. The average size of a household is 
often estimated to six persons*. Taking this into account, the claims decided upon might 
have included almost 9 % of the population. 
Sessions of HPCC, the judicial branch of HPD, were usually held six times per year. The 
collection of claims was conducted between the summer of 2000 and 1 July 2003 (HPCC 
2007). The frequency of property claims resolution varied throughout the years. In many 
cases, the HPCC conducted sessions during which many claims were decided upon, while in 
some months no such session was conducted. Figure I shows the amount of claim decisions 
made by the HPD and HPCC. 
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Figure I: The amount of claim decisions issued per month by HPD and HPCC (HPD 2005). 
 
Even though claim intake started in 2000, no significant numbers of decisions made by the 
HPCC was seen until April 2003, when over 1,300 claims were adjudicated in one month. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
 
* The Statistical Ofiice of Kosovo generally uses an estimation of the modal household in Kosovo of four adults and two 
children. Particularly Albanian households are often big with room for many members of the family. 
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 5.1.2 The concurrent increase in loans to households 
Loans from commercial banks to households have increased steadily during these years. The 
trend has been positive and quite rapid, thanks to an influx of foreign bank branches. Pro 
Credit bank entered as early as in 2000, followed by others in 2001. No statistics on 
household loans before September 2002 are available from the Central Bank of Kosovo. By 
then, depository corporations declared a modest total of 493,000 euro in household lending, 
which was less than 0,02 % of GDP*. In December of 2008, that figure had risen to 7,7% of 
GDP. A graph on household lending compared with GDP illustrates this. 
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Figure II: Value of household loans in Kosovo from depository corporations, as a share of GDP*, current 
prices in euro (BPK 2009 p.DC_S). 
 
It is perhaps not surprising that lending takes hold after a period of turmoil during which no 
official banking was conducted in the region. It is however possible that property rights 
enhancement helped to increase credit to households. Fluctuations in the speed of household 
lending growth can give a clue as to whether household property rights did contribute to this 
credit boost. 
Since residential property claims were resolved mainly between 2001 and 2006, I 
concentrate my analysis on household lending on this period, so that the fluctuations are 
easier to study. Figure III below, showing the total amount of decided claims and the 
percentage of GDP that constituted household lending, reveals some similarities. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
 
* GDP has been calculated using figures from the Statistical Office of Kosovo and the IMF. See the appendix for more 
information. 
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 Total decided claims and household loans as % of GDP
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Figure III: Columns: Accumulated number of claim decisions issued by HPD, measured by the left hand scale. 
Line: The value of household lending, as percentage share of GDP value, measured by the right hand scale. 
 
The graph reveals how the total amount of household claims that HPD decided upon has 
increased in line with bank credit to households. It is visible that around November 2002, 
lending from commercial banks started to take off in Kosovo and rose steadily thereafter. In 
this period, there are rapid increases in lending after May 2004 and April 2005. 
The rise and fall in lending between March and May 2004 is somewhat peculiar to 
interpret. The fluctuations, however, coincide with the riots that flared up in Kosovo 
between 18 and 19 March that year. The sharp decrease after April 2004 might be an effect 
of the resulting insecure situation, followed by a stabilized atmosphere a month later when 
lending increased. Since many properties were destroyed during the riots, the peak might 
represent a temporary increased demand and supply for loans for restoring properties. Banks 
may then have briefly allowed for lending on somewhat riskier terms. Also, the insecure 
situation with people leaving Kosovo or moving within the region, made statistical 
estimations somewhat inaccurate and the fluctuations may in fact be overstated. 
The next increase in household lending in comparison to GDP occurs between May and 
July 2005. In April 2005, a record 4,413 claims were decided upon and in February in that 
year, the number was 2,667. While this is the last real big increase in decided claims, this is 
also the last bigger increase that is observed in household lending in this period. From 
comparing these graphs, it seems that as an increased amount of people with legal and secure 
ownership had their property ownership case decided by HPD, a little more than a month 
                                                                                                                                                                         
 
*Ibid. 
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 later a significant share of them was granted banks loans. As claims decisions were petering 
out in mid-2005, the increase in household lending was no longer as rapid. 
The phenomena seem to be somewhat connected. Next, I will examine some other 
indicators to find whether this notion can be falsified. 
5.1.3 Regional comparison 
In search of international causes to the shape of the loan curve, a comparison in the trends of 
loans to household can be made with neighboring countries. National banks in the former 
Yugoslav countries provide information about household lending, which can be compared in 
order to examine whether any broader changes in the household loans were occurring 
generally in the region. That might indicate that regional factors were affecting these 
countries, and possibly Kosovo as well. 
All former Yugoslav countries are included to make this comparison except for Slovenia. 
Joining the European Union in May 2004, this affected the institutional economic situation 
in Slovenia and thus probably its access to credit. Montenegro is also not included since it 
was a part of Serbia until 2006. The countries included in this analysis are Serbia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia and The Republic of Macedonia. Below is a graph revealing the 
values of household loans for each country divided by GDP. For a comparison between 
Kosovo and the other countries, the mean value of all countries except that of Kosovo is 
represented by the series denominated “Index”. 
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Figure IV: Household lending as a share of GDP in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and 
FYROM (NBS 2007, NBS 2009, CBBH 1999, 2003, 2007, 2009, CNB 2009, NBRM 2006, 2008). 
 
 27
 In virtually all other Yugoslav countries did the ratio between household loans and GDP rise 
since 2001. Examining this graph, there seems to be several years still, until Kosovo is on 
the same level as its neighbors. 
To spot any regional trend, I examine how the loan ratio in Kosovo has changed in 
comparison to other countries. If the rapid increases observed in Kosovo coincide with 
increases in other countries, this is an indication that other factors than domestic ones had an 
effect on these fluctuations. The graph below reveals the value of the credit to GDP in 
Kosovo divided by the index from the other countries taken together. 
Kosovo loan to GDP divided by the Index values
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Figure V: Value of 
household loans in 
Kosovo divided by GDP, 
divided with the index 
compounded by the 
average values of loans 
as a share of GDP in 
other countries. 
 
 
Figure V is similar to the previous Kosovo loan curve, with an unsteady period in the spring 
of 2004 and an increase in lending after April 2005. Two slight changes can be spotted. 
Here, the changes after April 2004 do not result in any major increase in relative lending, as 
it did in figure II. This is because several other countries also saw an increase in lending at 
that time. It seems likely therefore that the increase which could not be related to any 
changes in the number of property claim resolutions might instead have been a result of 
regional factors. 
The increase in lending to households after April 2005 seems not to have been strong in 
other countries however, implying that the effort with property rights in Kosovo did play a 
part at that time. After this period, while lending continued to increase in the neighboring 
countries, it did not in Kosovo to the same extent. This can be concluded from the slight 
downturn in the curve in 2005. The work of property rights resolutions decreased 
significantly after June 2005, when in one month 1,274 claims were decided. The effect of 
those cases would presumably be observed roughly one month afterwards, and at that time 
the rate of household loans in comparison to other countries did indeed increase. But for the 
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 rest of that year, lending in Kosovo was lowered in comparison to other countries, 
coinciding with a period with only small amounts of claim resolutions. 
This analysis of regional development therefore only further strengthens the claim that 
property rights resolutions in Kosovo contributed to raise bank lending. Other major factors 
affecting bank lending and access to credit are examined later. But firstly, I study the 
possible effect of the KPA administration on credit access. 
5.2 Increasing loans to the agricultural sector 
5.2.1 Decision statistics from the KPA 
As KPA was established, claims were accepted not only on residential property but on 
agricultural land and commercial property as well. When 38,335 claims had been received in 
the beginning of December 2007, 90 % of them were claims on agricultural land and only 
7,4 % and 2,6 % on residential and commercial property respectively. Thus, while in July 
2003, 29,160 claims on residential property had been received by HPD, only 2,812 such 
claims were received by KPA (KPA 2007 p.24). In October 2008, the total number of claims 
received by KPA had risen to 39,758, with claims on agricultural land constituting 91,7% of 
total claims (KPA November 2008).  
The demand for a resolution on many disputes and uncertainties regarding agricultural 
land was thus large. During the war, not only residential property, but also tens of thousands 
of commercial and agricultural properties, had been seized illegally (ICTJ 2009 p.13).  There 
was also a big problem with illegal construction on agricultural land. Arable land was made 
unusable as commercial property was erected on patches of land without clear ownership 
(p16). Before KPA started rapidly processing their claims, ownership disputes over 
agricultural land could only be solved by a long process in an ordinary court. 
Statistics from the KPA do not reveal whether decisions over claims at different times 
are on agricultural land, residential property or commercial property. However, since 
agriculture land claims constitute a large share, the total number on claims decided upon is 
useful for examining the impact on the agriculture sector. 
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 Notably, the number of decisions by 
the KPA increased during 2008. 
Though the intake of claims started 
earlier, KPA did not manage to 
complete larger numbers of decisions 
until the end of 2007. 
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Figure VI: Number of decided claims per 
KPCC session (KPA November 2008 p.2). 
 
5.2.2 Rising bank loans to the agricultural sector 
As in the case with household loans, bank credit to the agricultural sector has increased 
sharply throughout the years after the war. The graph below illustrates this phenomenon. 
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Figure VII: The value of loans by 
depository corporations to the 
agricultural sector, as a share of 
GDP in percent (BPK 2009 
p.ODC_LBI). 
 
 
Figure VII shows that the lending rate increased rapidly after February 2007. This seems to 
coincide with the resolution of property claims. The graph below gives some clarity to this. 
It shows both the total amount of claim resolutions and the relative amount of agricultural 
sector loans. 
Figure VIII: Columns: 
Accumulated amount of decisions 
by KPA/CC, measured by the left 
hand scale. Line: Lending by 
depository corporations to the 
agricultural sector as a 
percentage share of GDP, 
measured by the right hand 
scale.  
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 Figure VIII reveals how the increase in loans during this period took hold before the 
decisions of KPA about agricultural land constituted any impressive figures. The increased 
total number of decided claims after February 2008 might explain some of the increase in 
agricultural sector lending thereafter. It is however obvious that other factors contributed to 
raising the amount of bank credit in the period after March 2007. 
One major other factor relating to property rights is privatization. Before moving on to 
examine this factor, however, I use one more method to examine the possible relationship 
between the work of KPA and the banks of Kosovo. 
5.2.3 Regional banking sector development 
A way to view the relationship between land property claim resolutions and banks’ 
willingness to offer credit is to compare regional differences in claim resolutions to the 
banking development in that region. Data on where the properties that was decided upon by 
KPA were situated is scarce but can still provide some useful clues. 
While most people live in the area of Prishtina, most claims decided by KPA were in the 
Pec and Gnjilane regions. One reason of the domination of more rural areas could naturally 
be the large share of agricultural claims where arable land is abundant. 
Pec region 31,3 % 
Gnjilane region 25,2 % 
Prishtina  region 18,1 % 
Prizren region 16,6 % 
Mitrovica region 8,8 % 
 
Table: Percentage share of claim resolutions by KPA, in September 2008, in the five regions of Kosovo 
(KPA September 2008 p.2) 
 
By the time that KPA started functioning, the banking sector in Kosovo was beginning to 
evolve and branches had spread throughout the region. When a bank sets up an office and 
employ people, they believe that there is an increased and steady demand for bank services, 
one of which being credit issuance. In January 2005, there were more than 30 bank 
employees working in each of the five regions in Kosovo. This might be enough to draw 
some conclusions about the differences between them. 
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 As figure IX reveals, the number of people employed at bank branches increased heavily in 
the area of Prishtina, which is natural since this is the regional capital where new businesses 
predominantly do emerge. The distinctions between other regions are, however, interesting 
to make. 
Number of employees at bank branches in each region
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Figure IX: Depository corporations 
number of employees in regions of 
Kosovo (BPK 2009 p.DC_Network). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the beginning of 2008, KPA started to increase the amount of claim decisions made 
substantially. Figure IX shows that since then, except for Prishtina, bank employees have 
increased the most in the regions of Pec and Gnjilane. The Pec region had one bank 
employee less than Prizren and seven more than Mitrovica when KPA started deciding 
claims on a larger scale in December 2007. This changed during 2008 with Pec having seven 
and 15 more bank employees than these two regions respectively, at the end of the year. 
Meanwhile, Gnjilane region started with six and 13 more employees than Prizren and 
Mitrovica respectively but ended the period with 15 and 23 employees more than those 
regions. 
The figures give a notion of whether property rights resolutions had an effect on the 
willingness of banks to be more accessible to new credit borrowers. The Central Bank does 
not provide statistics on loans to the agricultural sector in different regions within Kosovo. 
The numbers of employees at the banks in different regions of Kosovo instead provide a 
proxy for the areas in which more banking activity was conducted. 
The connection between claim resolutions and bank employees in different regions show 
signs that more legal ownership of agriculture land have contributed to increased banking 
activity. 
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 5.2.4 The impact of privatization 
The other factor that played an important role for the business climate and property rights 
was privatization, mainly of land and enterprises. The privatization of agriculture land might 
have had a considerable impact on lending to agricultural business. When the land is socially 
or state owned, there may not be a need to ask banks for loans as capital can be secured by 
the state. Also, the agricultural sector should grow when in some cases unexploited arable 
land is bought by someone willing to invest in the property. 
The agency responsible for privatization of socially owned corporations was an entity 
within UNMMIK established in 2002. It launched waves of privatization once every month 
or once every second month, during which tens of smaller and bigger companies were 
privatized. The firms were published on a public list and bidders could make their offers 
until a certain date. The contracts of the purchases were then publicly revealed. 
In order to estimate the scale of privatization of agricultural land, I count the areal of the 
privatized land. The price appeared to be an unreliable measure of the productivity of the 
land property, as it varied considerably. In some cases, the price of agricultural land was 
zero, though the land was declared as arable. The price might have been low to secure the 
sell of farmable but unexploited land. Privatization could have a significant impact on the 
loan rate as productivity may be widely enhanced. 
Total privatized hectares of agricultural land and agricultural 
sectror loans as % of GDP
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Figure X: Columns: The 
accumulated area of 
privatized arable land in 
hectares, measured by 
the left hand scale. Line: 
Loans to the agricultural 
sector, as a percentage 
share of GDP, measured 
by the right hand scale. 
 
Figure X reveals that when agricultural land is concerned, privatization and the amount of 
bank credit appear somewhat interconnected. It seems like credit access was more 
influenced by the rate of privatization than by property rights claim resolutions. The rate of 
privatization does not fully explain the rise in loans, as it increased after February 2007, 
when the total privatization of agricultural land was still relatively low. However, the slight 
increase in January 2007 might have had some effect in this context. 
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 5.3 Falsifying the importance of property rights 
I have shown that there are signs suggesting that increased property rights and land 
privatization was connected to bank lending. In this section, I analyze other changes in the 
economy which might affect the lending rate, examining whether they can contradict the 
notion of the importance of property rights. I include the development of the banking sector, 
loan interest rates, the velocity of money and the black market. In conclusion, the 
phenomenon of credit rationing is presented as this seems to have been an important feature 
of the banks’ conduct. Also, I discuss whether increased lending really was a result of 
increased bank supply or whether it was driven by bank customer demand. 
5.3.1 The blossoming banking sector 
Before the war in 1999, no functioning financial intermediaries existed in Kosovo. It was 
therefore crucial to establish a functioning financial system as soon as the conflict ended 
(BPK 2005 pp.2-3). In 1999, the central bank was established.* Soon commercial banks 
entered as well. Rules on the banking system have been based on the Basel Accords and no 
regulation of interest rates has been practiced. 
Since 1999, the financial system of Kosovo has developed rapidly. Considering that the 
commerce in the region was almost entirely based on hard cash before the war, the success 
in terms of increased lending and deposits, as measured against GDP, is noteworthy. Total 
bank lending to all sectors increased from less than 1 % of GDP in December 2001, to 
almost 8 % two years later and almost 25 % in December 2008. 
After the end of the war, Pro Credit bank was the first to establish a branch in Kosovo in 
2000. By mid-2006, 6 banks were operating in Kosovo, together with 8 insurance 
companies, a universal pension fund, 16 microfinance institutions and 12 exchange bureaus 
(BPK 2007 p.2).  Doubtlessly, this development has been the driving force behind increased 
lending from banks. The private sector has become more inclined to keep savings in bank 
deposits while banks have been more willing to trust the private sector with credit. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
 
* The central bank bore the name the Banking and Payments Authority of Kosovo (BPK). It was in 2006 replaced by The 
Central Banking Authority of Kosovo (CBAK). 
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 If lending to households and the agriculture sector increased after the war only as a result of 
this development, household credits would have increased at the same rate as other private 
sector loans. However, when comparing household loans to total loans from commercial 
banks in Kosovo, excluding loans to the central government, it becomes obvious that this is 
not the case. The figure below illustrates this. 
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Figure XI: Loans from depository 
corporations to households, as a 
percentage share of their total lending 
(BPK 2009 p.DC_S). 
 
 
 
Figure XI shows how lending to households has increased in comparison to loans to other 
sectors. It seems that lending to households increased not only as a share of GDP, but 
compared to total lending of commercial banks as well. 
There was clearly a significant, though unsteady, rise in household credit around April to 
June 2004. As previously concluded, this might be caused by factors affecting the whole 
Yugoslav region. In comparison to total lending, the rise in household credits after April 
2005 is still significant. This implies that the rise in lending is not explained with increasing 
private sector lending overall. 
 Further, there is a turning point in September 2005, after which household loans in 
comparison to total loans from commercial banks in Kosovo first decreased and then 
stabilized around 30 % of total lending. This coincides with the end of the intensive period 
of claim resolutions in the summer of 2005. This might therefore be connected to the 
handling of property rights. 
Loans to the agricultural sector can 
be examined in the same fashion. 
The result is illustrated by the graph 
to the left. 
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Figure XII: Loans to the agricultural sector, 
as a percentage share of total lending (BPK 
September 2008 p.ODC_LBI). 
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 Figure XII shows how agricultural sector loans have increased compared to total lending. 
From 2 % during 2003, it doubled to around 4 % at the end of the period. In contrast to 
household loans, agricultural sector loans did not decrease as a share of total lending after 
September 2005. It continued to rise until August 2007, when it stayed fairly steady on that 
level and has since only increased in line with total commercial bank lending. 
There is an interesting contrast to be noted between household lending and agricultural 
sector lending as a share of total bank credit. This is illustrated in the graph below. 
Figure XIII: Grey line: Agricultural 
sector loans as a percentage share 
of total lending from depository 
corporations, measured on the left 
hand scale. Black line: Lending to 
households as a percentage share 
of total lending from depository 
corporations, measured on the right 
left hand scale. 
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Lending to both sectors increased rapidly until fall in 2005. After this, lending to households 
began decreasing as a share of total lending. Lending to the agricultural sector, however, 
kept rising. If lending to the agricultural sector was increased by either property rights 
reform or privatization, both prevalent at that time, this pattern would be expected. It is also 
clear in both cases that the increase in lending depended not only on a rising amount of total 
bank credit. 
5.3.2 Other methods to estimate financial sophistication 
Another way to examine whether the over-all financial climate was behind increased house 
lending is by examining the velocity of money. This is one way to assess the sophistication 
of the financial market. In an advanced financial system, transaction costs from changing 
between cash and bank deposits are low. This allows people to in a higher degree lend their 
savings to the bank while being able to obtain them easily and cheaply when needed. Private 
actors then make use of deposit corporations for transactions and savings to a larger extent. 
As this produces a better allocation of financial recourses, it is generally beneficial for the 
economy. 
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 Another way of interpreting velocity of money is that people rather keep more coins and 
notes at home when uncertain about future expenditure needs. With lower velocity, 
households and firms are keeping a disproportionately large amount of currency compared to 
their expenditures (Faig, Jerez 2007 p.844). 
Velocity is generally measured as [GDP] / [Money Stock] (Burda, Wyplosz 2005 p.184).  
To measure the money stock, one can examine the amount of currency in circulation plus 
checkable deposits, known as “M1” (Faig, Jerez 2007 p.843). However, as it is unsure 
whether such deposits were truly easily available to extract money from in this uncertain 
period, the measure of currency in circulation only would be the most suitable to examine. 
Monthly statistics of currency in circulation in Kosovo can be found between December 
2003 and December 2006. This is useful for the analysis of the relation between velocity and 
household lending during this period. The velocity of money, calculated as [GDP] / 
[Currency in circulation], is presented in the graph below. 
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Figure XIV: velocity of money, 
measured as GDP divided by 
currency in circulation (BPK May 
2005, June 2005, January 2006, 
May 2006). 
 
 
The velocity of money has increased in Kosovo during this period. The money supply has 
been decreasing while GDP has been rising slowly. This corroborates the observation that 
lending generally has been increasing throughout the years. 
Another way to assess the economical development is by assessing the size of the black 
market in an economy. It is assumed that the bulk of the informal economic activities is 
conducted through cash money and perhaps also sight deposits. A way to measure the size of 
the black economy is therefore to divide the value of currency in circulation with GDP. This 
will create a mirror image of velocity, and this graph will be low as velocity is higher. The 
interpretation of changes in velocity or black market is thereby two sides of the same coin. 
There are naturally many ways to define well developed financial markets. In the 
Financial Development Report (2008), The World Economic Forum takes account of the 
institutional and business environment, financial stability, banks size, efficiency, market 
concentration, the degree of correct information disclosure and the degree of development of 
 37
 non-bank financial intermediaries. They also include the size and depth of the financial 
market and the access to financial services. It is thus clear that estimating the velocity of 
money is a simple but insufficient method to assess financial development.  
I can conclude that the banking sector, along with the financial market as a whole, has 
been developing fast during this period, gradually increasing in sophistication. This gives 
weight to the previous observation of increased over all lending by the banking sector. It 
does however not explain the relative rise in lending to households and the agricultural 
sector. 
5.3.3 Did changes in interest rates play a part? 
Another possible explanation of increases in lending can be lower interest rates. As the price 
of a loan falls, households and firms might be more willing to ask for credit. Interest rates 
reflect the stability of the economy as a whole. Banks set interest rate on the basis of their 
reliance on the customers repaying the loan and the expected rate of inflation. As previously 
concluded, interest rates may be lowered if collateral security for loans is available. Also, the 
private sector increases its deposits when trust in the bank sector increases, which raises the 
liquidity of banks and allows banks to lower interest rates as lending becomes less riskful. 
In Kosovo after 1999, interest rates of loans to households and to business have varied 
only slightly. I start with examining nominal interest rates on household loans. They have 
been fairly high and steady while real interest rates have fluctuated since the large price 
increases in 2007. The graph below gives an illustration of this. The real interest rate is here 
calculated as the nominal interest rate minus the inflation rate, which is measured by 
changes in consumer price index (CPI). 
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Figure XV: Black line: Nominal interest rates of household loans. Grey line: Real interest rates of household 
loans, measured as nominal interest rates minus changes in CPI (BPK 2009 p.ODC_IRR, Statistical Office of 
Kosovo December 2008). 
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 There was one small decrease in nominal interest rates of loans to households between May 
and June 2004, when it was lowered from a level of 14,4 % by 1,4 %. Interest rates then 
continued to slowly declined to 12,3 % in December 2004. However, when comparing these 
changes to fluctuations in the CPI, it turns out that the real interest rate was as low as 12 % 
only for one to two months. As consumer prices started decreasing after August 2004, the 
real interest rate again increased. 
An issue in this context is whether real interest rates or nominal interest rates matter the 
most for the willingness of households to take on loans. Nominal interest rates have been 
fairly steady and on a high level. After the decrease in rates between May and June 2004, 
they were still as high as 13 %, which means that the modest decrease cannot have had but a 
minimal effect. The nominal interest rate did not drop around the time in April 2005 when 
lending to households increased, and does therefore not seem to have contributed to this. 
If inflation and deflation were being accounted for, real interest rates would have 
mattered. As we have seen, real interest rates rose shortly in the end of 2004, and 
subsequently soon returned back to previous levels. If loans to the household sector were 
mainly short-term, this fluctuation might have made some difference in lending. However, in 
June 2004, only 22 % of household loans had a maturity shorter than one year, and that share 
shank to 15 % in June 2006. In June 2004, over 60 % of loans had a maturity of more than 
two years, and this share has been steadily growing since then (BPK 2009 p.ODC_LMB).  
If households and banks were aware of temporary fluctuations in real interest rates, that 
still should not have had a major impact on the credit market since most loan maturities are 
much longer than that. Small fluctuations observed in CPI cannot have added much to this 
picture. Significant increases in CPI are not observed until in August 2007, but this is 
beyond this analysis of household lending. 
The interest rates to the commercial sector have been quite steady throughout the years 
as well, hovering around 15 %. Thus, while the banking sector grew, no sign of an 
increasing trust of the commercial banks was seen as far as interest rates are concerned. 
Figure XVI: Black line: Nominal 
interest rates on bank loans for 
corporations, except financial 
corporations. Grey line: Real interest 
rates, measured as nominal interest 
rates minus change in CPI (BPK 2009 
p.ODC_IRR, Statistical Office of 
Kosovo December 2008). 
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 Industries in general might have been affected by rising consumer prices in mid-2007, 
causing the real interest rate to drop sharply. Total lending to business have indeed increased 
steadily since that time. As we have seen though, the share of agricultural loans to total 
lending did also increase at this time. Also, there is nothing indicating that the agricultural 
sector would have been more affected than other kinds of firms by this drop in real interest 
rates. 
The high and steady levels of interest rates might seem to represent the equilibrium on 
the credit market. This might not however be the case. Hoff and Stiglitz (1995), when 
elaborating on rural credit markets, acknowledged that one often sees very high interest rates 
in rural and farming areas. They saw this as a cause of the imperfection of rural credit 
markets. The “imperfect information paradigm” explains why lenders set a high interest rate. 
Direct mechanisms for valuing the credit worthiness of a borrower may not be accessible to 
lenders. This would otherwise allow them to lower interest rates, at least for those who seem 
to be secure borrowers. 
We have seen that in Kosovo, there seems to have been no major increases or decreases 
in banks’ interest rates that would have affected the amount of loans to the household sector 
or to the agricultural sector any more than to other credit receivers. Also, a conclusion can be 
drawn that although equilibrium for interest rates could be found, collateral security must be 
included in the equation. 
5.4 Credit rationing 
As the interplay between interest rates and bank loans has been presented along with an 
understanding of the ways in which access to collateral security may increase that to credit 
from banks, we are ready to look into the phenomenon of credit rationing. An explanation to 
the nature of credit rationing will here be presented, as well as the indicators that this has 
been, and indeed still is, a prevalent occurrence on the financial market in Kosovo. 
While interest rates have remained high and steady, there have been large increases in 
loans to both households and agricultural sector firms. This relation is a strong indicator that 
borrowers of bank credit have been subjected to credit rationing. How can this phenomenon 
be explained and how well does it hold up to economic theory about the importance of 
property rights for assets to be used as collateral security? 
 40
 Credit can be analyzed as any good being traded in a market, where interest rate is the price 
set to where supply meets demand. When the quantity of a traded good increases, this can be 
due either to greater demand, greater supply or a combination of both. When interest rates, 
the price of borrowing money, show no significant downward trend, the increase in 
household loans cannot be explained with the simple assumption that lending increases as 
demand for credit does, because of lower prices. Instead, banks choose to lend more at the 
same price level, meeting a larger share of the market demand. 
The term for this phenomenon is credit rationing. When banks are unsure about the 
ability of borrowers to repay a loan, they might restrict lending in order to reduce risk 
instead of raising interest rates. Even if households expect their future wealth to increase, 
salary to rise and a university education to lead to a stable income in a few years time, banks 
cannot make the same assessment. When bank customers cannot receive the amount of 
credit that they would like at the current interest rate, they are said to be credit rationed.  
One solution to the lack of information about a household’s reliability is for the bank to 
demand collateral security for a loan (Burda, Wyplos 2005 p.135). When supply is restricted 
at a constant interest rate level, collateral security can be used to sort out the borrowers 
credible enough to receive a loan. 
5.4.1 Why a bank is credit rationing 
 It might seem counterintuitive that a bank would demand collateral for a loan instead of 
raising interest rates. In any situation, if a supplier of a good or service prefers a certain 
amount of buyers, the most profitable way to select these would be to set a price high 
enough to meet this demand. 
Hoff and Stiglitz (1990) explained why a lender might not have an incentive to increase 
the interest rate further and instead employ credit rationing. When interest rates rise, they 
remarked, some lenders on the margin will no longer desire the loan. These typically have 
lower average revenues but also lower risks. Left are customers with businesses exposed to a 
higher risk of default but with a higher expected net return. If a bank is aware that a larger 
share of borrowers is in high risk of default, it will be prompted to raise interest rates further. 
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 It always will be those with the lowest risk of failing to repay the loan who will no longer 
accept the terms. This creates a situation of adverse selection*.  
 There will thus be a trade-off for the credit lender between obtaining a lot of risky credit 
customers and the return on the loan in the form of a high interest rate. At some point, the 
lender will not wish to raise the interest rate any further, and will have to find means to 
select customers that are in less of a risk of defaulting. As this creates a situation where 
demand for credit is higher than the supply, bank customers are being credit rationed. 
Bester (1985) made the proposition in 1985 that no credit rationing would occur in a 
competitive market. He outlined a model where borrowers and lenders with different 
preferences should engage in contracts on a free market. He then reasoned that the access to 
collateral security works as a signaling mechanism that should compensate for the problem 
of imperfect information, averting the occurrence of adverse selection. He recognized, 
though, that low-risk borrowers may still not have the required collateral needed for this 
screening mechanism to work correctly and in such case, some adverse selection may still 
occur. 
5.4.2 Credit rationing in practice 
The next question is how much damage credit rationing actually could cause. Here, the size 
of the market portion being affected by banks credit rationing is crucial.  
Field (2006) raised this issue in her study of the state led titling program in Peru. In 
seeking the ratio of households being credit rationed, she used a survey to ask people if they 
were being rejected a loan or if they would accept a loan were they offered one. She 
assumed that those who wanted a loan but had not applied for one were self-sorted from the 
market, aware that they would be rejected by the bank. She found that 34 % of households 
were by this definition credit rationed. She could conclude that credit rationing indeed is a 
common feature in Peru. 
Private sector banks could individually lower interest rates, while the Peruvian public 
bank was unable to do so in the same extent and therefore had a bigger tendency to quantity 
                                                                                                                                                                         
 
* This is the same problem that occurs for insurance companies with inadequate information about their customers. As the 
least risky customers will find it unprofitable to pay a high fee for an insurance, they will be the first to cancel insurance 
contracts as prises are raised, inducing the company to charge even higher fees (Burda, Wyplos 2005 p.147). 
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 ration (p.23). This became obvious as households gained titles on their properties, whereby 
the public bank to a large extent than the private institutions reduced credit rationing. 
Credit rationing to farmers may also occur quite frequently. In a study on Polish farmers, 
Petrick (2004) found that credit rationing was common, creating an excess demand amongst 
farmers for credit. While the interest rate was around 13 %, the farmers’ average willingness 
to pay for a loan was over 200 % in interest rate, according to a survey. 
He could also conclude that collateral security for the credit was crucial and that 
properties like tractors and rented land was not very useful as security for the loans. This 
indicates that legally owned immovable property really was central when credit rationing 
was concerned. 
With an unchanged interest rate to the agricultural sector in Kosovo, the same situation 
might be persistent here. Farmers would probably be prepared to pay a significantly higher 
interest rate than the one on offer. In a paper issued for The Agro-Business Development 
Unit in 2004, credit to farmers was recognized as depending heavily on collateral security, 
the value of which sometimes had to exceed 200 % of the loan if it was to be accepted 
(Oldham, Chatham 2004 p.3). 
It was acknowledged that while agriculture accounted for about 20 % of GDP in Kosovo, 
lending to the agricultural sector from commercial banks was only 3 % of total lending to 
industries (p.2). It was also noted that an unstable business climate persisted in Kosovo since 
the war. In a stable economy, the agriculture sector is usually seen to provide the least secure 
level of output. In a place like Kosovo, agriculture had therefore in comparison with other 
businesses been relatively secure (p.10). The willingness of commercial banks to lend to the 
agricultural sector would decrease, they reasoned, when other sectors of the economy 
became more stable and attractive to lend to. 
Since then however, the ratio of lending to the agricultural business as a share of total 
lending has increased. It seems plausible that other factors, such as enhanced property rights, 
are behind these changes. But lending has only increased to a level of 4 % of GDP. This 
implies that credit rationing has not in any way disappeared. 
5.4.3 The role of bank competition 
There are empirical studies that show that when banks are large and have little close contact 
with customers they are unable to evaluate the risk that borrowers will be defaulting on 
loans. There is then a higher risk of credit rationing. It is therefore crucial to evaluate the 
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 competition in the banking sector. Larger, fewer and foreign banks induce more credit 
rationing. In Kosovo, two large foreign banks have long dominated the banking sector. And 
as figure XVII shows, the competition in lending between banks only seems to have 
decreased. 
 
Figure XVII: The market share of assets, loans and deposits of the two largest banks (BPK June 2006 
p.19). 
 
There is a high concentration in the banking sector, which is dominated by two foreign 
banks that in December 2006 obtained 73,2 % of the market. This is yet another indicator of 
credit rationing by the banks in Kosovo. 
The central bank acknowledged this in a report in 2005 (BPK 2005). A value of 1,800 of 
the HH-index is considered a sign of high market concentration, submitted to antitrust laws. 
In Kosovo in December 2004, this index was at 2,536 (p13, note 16). For the lending 
activity, this measurement of competition was in December that year 2,031, a figure that had 
risen to 2,191 in June the following year (BPK June 2005 p.19). 
The banking climate in Kosovo has been highly uncompetitive. This low competition has 
probably made it easier to engage in credit rationing. 
5.4.4 Not a rise in demand for credit 
I have explained how enhanced property rights in Kosovo may have contributed to increase 
lending. An owner of a property can use it as collateral security, which lowers the risks when 
lending to that household or farmer. However, one can also argue that the actual reason why 
lending has increased is a raise in demand for credit. Here, we can study the household 
expenditures in search of implications. 
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 If people feel more secure about the chance to remain in a house or an apartment, their 
willingness to invest in repairs and maintenance might increase. It could therefore be the 
demand for credit that has increased and pushed up lending. If lending had increased 
because of the need for credit to finance investment in properties, there would have been a 
general increase in spending on immovable property. If credit access meanwhile did not 
increase, there would simply have been a shift in investment from movable to immovable 
property. 
Data on consumer expenditures in Kosovo throughout the years show that there has not 
been any simple transfer of money to immovable property for household. Spending on 
furnishing, household, equipment and routine maintenance of the house as a share of CPI did 
in fact drop between 2002 and 2006 from 7.6 % to 5.9 %, a decrease of 22.4 %. This cannot 
be explained by a fall in the prices on such items, since it only dropped by 2.5 %. This 
decline was 2.0 % more than the total decline of 0.5 % in CPI during that period (Statistical 
office of Kosovo 2008 p.10). 
Since the decline in prices was modest, it cannot fully explain the decrease in the value 
of spending on household maintenance. Declining prices could in fact induce people to buy 
more, perhaps spending the same share of their income on house maintenance as prices fall. 
Since this has not been the case, there seems to be no great interest in renovating and 
repairing houses more than was previously the case. 
As access to credit has increased, people have instead been spending more on water and 
fuel, but also on education, communication and health (Ibid.). This is yet another sign that 
raised lending stemmed from a rise in credit supply as a result of access to collateral 
security, and not from an increase in demand for credit to renovate properties. 
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 6 Conclusions 
In the essay I have explored ways to argue for and against the impact of property rights on 
the availability of bank credit. Kosovo is a good object of study for this purpose, since its 
process of property titling has been documented relatively well and on a monthly basis. It 
has been revealed that with the short time frame at hand, the inevitably low amount of data 
means that no statistical relationship between these parameters can be established. Instead, a 
broad macro economical picture has been painted in the search of factors contributing to the 
increase and fluctuation in the rate of bank credit to households and the agricultural sector, 
in order to balance it with the possible impact of enhanced property rights.  
I find signs that the juridical resolution of property disputes had some impact on the 
amount of credit to both households and the agricultural sector. Except for the assumption 
that secure property rights would have had a positive impact on increased lending overall, 
two factors stand out to support this notion. After the largest increase in resolved claims on 
residential property in April 2005, lending to households increased significantly. No other 
factor presented here can explain this sudden increase. Also, since many residential 
properties were being titled before 2006 and mainly agricultural land claims afterwards, 
lending to these sectors was compared over time. In the end of 2005, household credit as a 
share of total lending was lowered while the share of lending to agricultural firms showed an 
increase that coincides with the bulk of claim resolutions on agricultural land. 
There seems to be no sign that the fluctuation in the increase in bank credit to households 
was due to any regional factor. This was controlled for by comparing household lending in 
Kosovo to that in the neighboring former Yugoslav countries of Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia and 
FYROM. 
The connection between property rights cases resolutions and loans to the agricultural 
sector was generally less distinct. Much of the increase in bank lending to the sector 
occurred before any major increases in decisions over agricultural land property rights. 
However, data on the increases in employees of bank branches in different regions of 
Kosovo seem connected to that of the number of resolutions in property rights cases. 
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 The privatization of state owned arable land seems more likely to have played a role in 
credit access to the agricultural sector. As vast patches of land were put up for sale to private 
investors, lending to the agricultural sector increased. 
The over all development of the banking sector was undoubtedly the major factor behind 
increased lending in general. However, also as a share of total lending did lending to both 
households and to the agricultural sector increase and fluctuate in a similar fashion as when 
compared only to GDP. 
The increased sophistication of the banking sector can be observed by comparing the 
amount of currency in circulation with GDP. This gives both a measure of the velocity of 
money and of the size of the black market. Velocity has increased steadily and black market 
share of the economy has decreased. This implies better access to credit over all but does not 
present any alternative explanations of the fluctuations in lending examined. 
As both real and nominal interest rates have remained high and steady for many years 
until 2007, that should not have had an impact on bank credit either. It is important to note 
that when interest rates are steady while the amount loans increase, borrowers may be credit 
rationed. This is when banks choose not to increase interest rates even though demand for 
credit exceeds the supply. The households and agricultural firms that receive the loans will 
then be those with access to a property applicable as collateral security. This is most likely a 
property that is legally registered to the bank customer. 
Taking account of various macroeconomical factors and theories concerning collateral 
security for loans, a comprehensible picture of the market for bank credits in Kosovo 
emerges. Signs of an impact of increased property rights after the war cannot be falsified, 
while unchanged interest rates indicate a presence of bank credit rationing. 
I have explored a simple way to assess the economical impact of a property titling 
policy. The detailed time series data on property rights claim resolutions can make Kosovo a 
special case. This type of method might however be applied in studies where similar 
property titling programs have been imposed. 
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 8 Appendix I: The data 
8.1 Claims decisions 
The statistics on decisions is gathered from the internet sites of HPD and KPA. Only first 
instance decisions are accounted for, which is done for two reasons. Firstly, accounting for 
both first and second instance decisions would give the picture that many more claims have 
been resolved in total than what is actually the case. Second, it is not clear how many of the 
decisions were appealed against and reconsidered for every given month, making it 
impossible to detract them from the data on claims decided. 
The year during which the amount of reconsidered cases may be of importance is 2006. 
That year, 2,441 reconsideration requests were decided upon. While this is not a particularly 
high number, it was larger than the 179 first instance cases left from the previous year that 
HPCC decided upon. 
8.2 GDP 
Depending on which source that one relies upon, GDP growth and level are different. The 
Statistical Office of Kosovo (Economic statistics, national accounts) present on their 
homepage the following figures for GDP, in millions of euro: 
   The Statistical Office of Kosovo 2004 2005 2006 2007
GDP at current prices, million euro 3,006.1 3,068.3 3,191.6 3,433.6 
In order to use GDP figures for estimations against other macroeconomic data, I combine 
statistics from the Statistical Office of Kosovo with estimates from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).  It estimated the real growth rate in 2008 to 5,4 %. With the 
Statistical Office of Kosovo estimating the inflation to around 0,5 %, the real growth rate 
will be approximately 5,9 %. 
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 To calculate GDP levels in previous years, IMF estimates from 2006 are used (World 
Bank September 2006 p.3): 
 
 
 
Since the level of GDP is estimated differently, one cannot connect the time series without 
recalculation. The growth rate of the IMF figures from 2006 is therefore applied to the GDP 
data from the Statistics Office of Kosovo. GDP for these years are thereby estimated as 
follows: 
 IMF 2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Real GDP at current 
prices, million euro. 
1,750 2,423 2,482 2,496 2,542 2,463
 Combined series 2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Real GDP at current 
prices, million euro. 
2,069.5 2,865.4 2,935.1 2,951.7 3,006.1 3,068.3
 
 
 
In order to make monthly estimates, the different GDP growth rates are assumed to be 
constant throughout each year. 
 
 
 
 
 
9 Appendix II: A note on neutrality 
This essay is in every way neutral to the issue of the status of Kosovo. The discussion about 
minority rights and refugees is included in the essay only because of their important 
influence as informal institutions. 
The spelling “Kosovo”, and not the Serbian “Kosovo i Metohija” or the Albanian 
“Kosova”, is the form most generally used in reports claiming to be status neutral in their 
discussion, or not siding with any ethnicity by the use of  language. 
Also the name Pec, Peja in Albanian, or those of any town and region mentioned are 
written in one form. Double alternatives of spelling are in these cases avoided to make the 
text simpler and not to draw the attention to the issue of spelling. 
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